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For centuries, various disciplines have tried to tackle the topic ofhow legitímate it
is to use violence in arder to solve social problems. One ofthe most recent inter-
disciplinary approaches, most successful in present-day Latín America, is the so-
called "Ethics of Liberation, " designedby Enrique Dussel. Based on the Theology
of Liberation, this theory goes beyond the limits oftheology as a discipline and
pleadsfor three ethical criteria that every political revolution mustfulfill to use
violence in a legitímate way. Theflrst is a formal criterion, which basically takes
after the ideal dialogue situation endorsedbyKarl-OttoApelandJürgen Habermas,
and purports to be rooted in yet another discipline, linguistics. The second is a
material criterion, defined as the upshot ofan acceptable welfarefor all citizens,
thus intimately linkedwith the discipline ofeconomics and politicalphilosophy. The
third is a criterion offeasibility, which makes a revolt legitímate if, and only if, it
has a reasonable possibility of succeeding; henee strategic issues take a leading
role. This essay contendí that each ofthese criteria is conceptually incompatible
•with violence. Henee, Dussel's arguments involve múltiple contradictions as he
aims tojustify the use of violence precisely with these interdisciplinary criteria.
INTERDISCIPLINARY ROLE OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY
T heoretical reflections on social oppression, poverty, and the meansto alleviate both, are among the outstanding contributions that
Spanish and Portuguese-speaking thinkers from diverse disciplines
have made in the twentieth century to world intellectual debate. Certainly,
doomed socio-economic infrastructures led them to treat this topic with
special urgency. Among intellectual proposals from various disciplines, one
that will be remembered, especially following the General Conference of Latín
American Bishops in Medellin (1968), is "Liberation Theology" (Gutiérrez
1972)~an attempt to connect theological reflection with urgent dilemmas in
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today's woríd. In practica! terms, this attempt produced arguably the largest
political-social and intra-ecclesiastical consequences and reactions regarding
Catholic thought in the 1970s-1980s. One of these consequences, as Paul E.
Sigmund vividly put it, was that many Catholic theologians "moved one step
further and began to cali for radical solutions to Latín American social
problems . . . . That it was a radicalism linked to the oldest and strongest
continent-wide institutional structure in Latín America-the Catholic Church—
made it all the more challenging—and, for some, threatening" (1990: 6).
The intellectual repercussions across disciplines of this thought are now
well-known, too, from the work of authors like Jon Sobrino, Juan Luis
Segundo, Ernesto Cardenal, Paulo Freiré, Leonardo Boff, Ignacio Ellacuría,
Pedro Casaldáliga, Freí Betto, Jung Mo Sung, Diego Irarrazaval in theology,
education, history, philosophy, political science, ethnology, and economics
(Richard 2008), to the occasional support for this theory by notable authors
working beyond Latín America, like the theologian Karl Rahner (Girardi
1986), the economist Mansoob Murshed (1999), and the Gender Studies
scholar Marcela Althaus-Reid (2003). The theoretical repercussion of
Liberation Theology considered here focuses on the development of an
interdisciplinary framework that the Argentine Enrique D. Dussel has
constructed over the years (1973-93), mainly in México, known as an Ethics
of Liberation or Liberation Ethics ("LE"). A general approach was presented
by Dussel himself in a book with the same title, Liberation Ethics (1998), the
main reference point for the reflections that follow. These reflections seek to
delve into LE by means of a notion that not only illuminates many of its
theoretical developments, but also refers to one of the most noticeable
practica! measures proposed by LE: violence, including the more than
anécdota! relationship of LE with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation
(EZLN).
"LE" AND JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE
Dussel does not defend violence per se, of course, but is obliged to make
a justification of it in war and revolution inasmuch as he considers it a means
to the end that he and LE advócate: the liberation of "the oppressed." One
should not conclude from certain somewhat ambiguous statements that Dussel
praises violence for its own sake~as when he talks nostalgically about today's
"fatal quietude, with no possible revolution on the horizon" (1998: 374).
Dussel quickly clarifíes that, for him, "revolution and war are certainly
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dramatic events" that cause "inevitable suffering and countless innocent
victims" (1998: 374). These concessions to the more politically correct
pacifíst discourse of the times do not lead Dussel, however, to renounce
completely his support for such violent "means of liberation" as war and
revolution. Dussel is certainly aware of the possibility of non-violent
revolutions (Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr.), which nevertheless
he rejects in most cases (1998: 377). Dussel does not even renounce
supporting violent "means of liberation" after explicitly citing texts such as
that of Hannah Arendt, in which she argües that the political theories of
revolution and war "can only be a justification of violence, and what is the
glorifícation or justification of violence as such is not political but
antipolitical" (1990:11). In fact, when Dussel quotes Arendt's dictum he does
not do so, as could be supposed, to condemn the use of violence in the
common space—the political sphere. Ironically, Dussel quotes Arendt to try
to show exactly the opposite of what this thinker meant: that one can justify
(politically, in Arendt's terms) violent conflict without justifying
("antipolitically") violence.
The way to pulí off this trick is the one adopted by almost all verbal
defenses of violence: accusing "the others" (those against whom one is waging
war or revolution) of the only real violence. To accomplish this, Dussel
strives throughout two paragraphs and an outline to change the usual Spanish
vocabulary (and by extensión, English) "slightly" more to his taste. Dussel
restricts the use of the word "violence" only to describe those regimes (or
revolutions) that are, in his opinión, ¡Ilegitímate, while legitímate revolutions
(or regimes) should, according to him, no longer be called "violent" in any
possible way, because they only use "legitímate coerción." As Dussel argües:
"The existing institution... should rely on a certain legitímate coerción that
will allow it to channel those who are not ready to fulfill the validly accepted
agreements" (1998: 375). Thus, in supporting Marxist revolutionaries like
Fidel Castro or the FSLN, defending the priest Father Hidalgo in New Spain,
or George Washington in the English colonies of North America, Dussel does
not see himself succumbing to Arendt's "antípolitics" by defending violence
(1998: 376-82). Rather, he is "only" supporting "legitímate coerción,"
whereas those who would be violent would be the regimes against which these
leaders rose up, since the action of those regimes was "illegitimate" coerción.
Therefore, for LE, it becomes most important to determine when a
political order or revolution may be considered legitimate-coercive, and when
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it should be considered illegitimate-violent. Dussel offers three criteria for
this throughout his extensive work. The first is callea formal, that is,
according to Karl-Otto Apel (1987) and Jürgen Habermas (1976), that which
views legitimacy as "the consensual acceptability of a political order shared
by the symmetrically argumentative members in a community of
argumentation" (Dussel 1998:378). That is, the legitimacy of a violent action
(or of an established system) would be achieved, according to this first
criterion, as long as that action was the result of a decisión taken by the
members of a community by consensus, after a democratic dialogue in which
they all can equally particípate and in which all are led by the "forceless forcé
of the best argument" (Habermas 1984: 161). However, to this first
legitimating requirement must be added a second, material criterion, which
according to Dussel is "missing in Weber and Habermas," and in general in
philosophers of "advanced societies" (1998:378). According to this material
criterion, the legitimacy of a political order (or revolutionary movement) must
reside as well in its "ability to produce, reproduce and develop the human life
of each of its members... on an acceptable or tolerable level" (Dussel 1998:
378). Finally, in Dussel's view, a third criterion must be required of regimes
or revolutions to prevent them from falling into utopian fantasies: the criterion
of feasibility, of the real practical possibility of a revolution or a political
system to succeed in a given historical situation. If the first criterion has a
remarkable Apelian-Habermasian philosophical-linguistic flavor, and the
second a clear economic and Aristotelian one, this third criterion is mainly
based in strategic considerations indebted to Dussel's intellectual exchange
with Franz Hinkelammert (2002).
Thus, for Dussel, violence is legitímate ("legitímate coerción") if, and
only if: (1) the decisión to use it as a means for liberating a community of the
oppressed is taken by them following a dialogue in which everyone can argüe
in the same conditions (a potentially universal dialogue); (2) the end of this
violence is to save their lives (not only in the biological sense); and (3) this
salvation is feasible. Therefore, symmetrically, "a regime that kills, excludes
or is of impossible empirical realization" would become "inevitably il-
legitimate" (Dussel 1998: 378). LE is "strictly interested" in that precise
moment in which the revolution is legitímate, and the regime is not: the
moment of legitímate violence against that regime (Dussel 1998:379). Now,
without questioning the three criteria of legitimacy that Dussel proposes, or
his euphemistic (adhocl Orwellian?) naming of certain types of violence as
"legitímate coerción," that moment of "legitímate" violence is impossible on
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Dussel's own terms. None of the criteria that Dussel proposes can be fülfilled
if a revolution uses arms and death, because there is an essential contradiction
between each of these criteria and violence, although Dussel unflaggingly
strives to defend at the same time those criteria and the use of violence or,
worse, tries to defend violence by way of those criteria.
WHY VIOLENCE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED PER DUSSEL
The question arises why none of the criteria that Dussel demands of a
violent revolution can be fülfilled if the revolution is violent, if it causes
death, injuries or destruction. The formal criterion of a symmetrical
agreement, to begin with, is radically incompatible with the use of armed
struggle, for two reasons. In the first place, it is difficult to defend, if one
wishes to be realistic, that within the community of the oppressed that decides
to form the revolutionary group there are real chances of establishing a totally
free, dialogical, and symmetrical accord among all its members. Utili-
tarianism and the desire to be effective usually make the ringleaders of any
serious armed group unlikely to allow either internal dissension or excessive
attention to questions of form (considered "empty bourgeois formalism" in the
Marxist lexicón). In real life, members of the "community of the oppressed,"
especially those in favor of non-violent struggle (ahimsá) or simply against the
use of violence, have little possibility of expressing their dissenting arguments
in a free and symmetrical dialogue with the leaders oían armed group or a
revolution. Dussel is not totally unaware of this dilemma, but seems to
dismiss its importance when he talks about it as a simple need of
"organization with a certain internal discipline" (1998: 379). Alas, this
"internal discipline" of armed groups is usually at odds with the real
possibility of dialogically questioning its methods from within. And, without
due dialogue, no legitimacy may be ascribed to that armed group precisely in
Dussel's terms.
This problem in Dussel's proposal becomes clearer if one looks at the
examples he provides as paradigms of "legitímate" violent and successful
revolutions. For example, the wars of independence in Latín America,
mentioned several times in rather praise-worthy terms (Dussel 1998:3 76-82),
were never carried out, as Dussel seems to imply, with the democratic
agreement of all the inhabitants of all the Latín American nations (the alleged
"oppressed communities"). There was, rather, a divergence of opinión in all
of them about the advisability or not of maintaining their ties with the Iberian
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Península, and what kind of ties (in some cases, with a majority not in favor
of independence). And this ínternal disagreement, instead of being resolved
through arguments in a symmetrical dialogue, was taken to arms on both
sides, as Dussel forgets to mention repeatedly. Habermas' or Apel's criteria
are hard to find in these examples of presumably "legitímate" revolutions.
The second problem of Dussel's formal criterion goes beyond this
difficulty of fulfilling it within the oppressed community, and the armed
groups that pretend to libérate it. It is incompatible with violence because of
the effects it provokes outside that oppressed community. It is easy to see that
those against whom violence is directed would not be included in the
symmetrical and universal dialogue that the formal criterion demands.
Therefore, this dialogue could not be considered either valid or "universal"
(what agent would consent to a decisión to have violence directed at oneself?).
The revolutionary group that uses violence would then become, according to
LE itself, the oppressor of those it attacks, since it excludes them from any
possible "universal" agreements in the most radical way possible~by killing
them.
This way, an armed group turns out to be precisely what Dussel, under
the influence of Emmanuel Levinas (1961), frequently calis an "oppressive
totality" (although he always does so by reference to other cases, not to the
armed groups that he likes): a totality that impedes dialogue within the group
(with the "pacifists" or dissenters of the armed group) and excludes certain
determined "others" (those labeled as "enemies" or "oppressors"). This fact
would place the armed group, always according to LE's own principies (its
"formal criterion"), in a position of illegitimacy at least as reprehensible as
that of the hegemonic system it rises up against. The result of this could not
be more hopeless: this hegemonic system could thus be considered to have
good ethical motives, even according to LE itself, to violently fíght against the
rebels and their "oppressive totality" (maybe directly, via the army or pólice,
maybe indirectly, via paratroopers). We would, then, be faced with the
paradoxical (and lamentable) situation of two human groups mutually
destroying each other with good ethical reasons "in their own eyes," "for
themselves," as Dussel somewhat recognizes (1998:382). But is that the real
aim of ethics, to provide good reasons for reciproca! massacre?
What about Dussel's "material criterion," with its economic and
Aristotelian undertones? It is reasonably clear that this criterion (the
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possibility of a íruitful and meaningful development and reproduction of life)
is not fulfílled in those against whom violence is exerted (even though they
may be "oppressors"). Those who are the victims of the violence unleashed
by the "revolutionaries," their "attacks," and their "armed actions," have little
possibility of life (not to mention its íruitful development and reproduction,
as Dussel likes to add). This is so evident that it needs little further
explanatíon. The use of violence in a revolution or war automatically caneéis
any possibility of fulfilling this criterion if one takes into account all humans
involved in that violence, also the victims of that revolution or war.
Furthermore, this "material" criterion suffers from two serious
theoretical drawbacks. In the first place, this criterion requires the government
to fulfill an "obligation" to provide life on "an acceptable level," if it wants to
be legitímate as a government. The requirement goes so far as to affirm that
"the failure to comply with this material requirement ipso facto rnakes the
political regimes of 'poor' countries '¿Ilegitímate', even if they have the
formal aspiration of being 'democratic'" (Dussel 1998:378). Let us consider
the implications of this kind of statements. Imagine the following scenario:
a country is going through a bad economic crisis, or suffering from economic
problems it inherited, or simply there are citizens dissatisfíed with their
standard of living (and dissatisfaction is never unusual among human beings).
Then, according to Dussel's proposal, the leaders elected at the polis should
be removed from office on the spot ("ipso facto," as he likes to say). And the
same over and over again, until the country becomes "rich" and, therefore, its
government is, in Dussel's opinión, "legitímate." The political instability thus
proposed not only seems scarcely earnest; it would be extremely dangerous,
and likely bring serious harm to the governed people and, more precisely, to
the economically worst-off among them. They would live under the distress
of a never-ending change of governments, a continuous de-legitimation of
every new elected president and administration if they do not solve ipso facto
the economic ailments of their country.
In fact, it is hard to understand why Dussel reserves such a tortuous
process as immediate dismissal, the illegitimacy of electíons, and the volatility
of all governments only for "poor" countries, which have enough problems
already (1998: 378). Ñor is it clear why, at one point, he declares Salvador
Allende's government "legitímate," if (according to this same criterion of ipso
facto illegitimacy of LE) the president that General Pinochet brutally took out
would have had a government record worthy of an even earlier destitution—
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there was a rapid decline in the Chileans' standard of living during his
mándate, with an inflation rate of 600 percent in 1973 (Falcoff 1989). Ñor
does Dussel tell us why a simple tax imposed on tea by the British Crown
threatened nothing less than the Ufe of the thirteen American colonies in such
a way as to justify a war of independence as "self-defense" (1998: 376). Or,
whether Australia or Canadá, which did not exercise at that time their "self-
defense" against "British attacks" on their life, were in any sense "dead" (and
if they were, why do they now figure among the most developed countries on
the planet?). Is Dussel trying to judge "ethically" historical processes that are
too complex to be proclaimed in toto legitímate or not?
Now, the second drawback of this vague "material" criterion, intimately
connected with the first, is the fact that it unabashedly attributes the basis of
political legitimacy to the success of economic policy. It thus merges politics
and economics, but with a clear predominance of the latter. Something which,
curiously, is not far from the technocratic theses of some pro-market
ideologues, who postúlate that policy should be subordinated to the proper
management of the economy (the only valid policies are those aimed at
producing wealth, that is, economic success). This paradoxical parallelism
with pro-market authors would lead Dussel, if he is to be consistent with his
own ideas, to have to declare some rulers ¡Ilegitímate according to LE, like it
or not: rulers who are not disagreeable to him, but whose economic successes
are more than doubtful (for example, Fidel Castro in Cuba, or Allende in
Chile 1973).
Finally, the feasibility criterion of a legitímate revolution cannot be
fulfílled if it includes violence since, given the above contradictions, it is clear
that an armed but legitímate struggle is a contradicho in terminis: it will
always constitute an attack on life (material criterion), and impede a
consensus argued by all the participants in an equitable dialogical situation
(formal criterion). Therefore, whenever violence is used for political action,
that which is sought (and which possibly will come to pass) in the ñame of
legitímate revolution will be different from what really conforms to LE and
its criteria of legitimacy. Thus, a "legitímate" revolution will never be
feasible. The examples that Dussel provides of revolutions that appear to be
"feasible" only corrobórate this impossibility of joining feasibility, legitimacy,
and violence. Nicaragua after Anastasio Somoza or Cuba after Fulgencio
Bautista, which could seem to be "feasible" revolutions since they were
"successful" (in the sense that the previous dictator, Somoza or Bautista, was
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overthrown), were not really legitímate revolutions if one adheres to the
formal and material criteria designed by Dussel himself, and thus were not
really successful ñor feasible. Even if one accepts success as a simple "raising
to power of the ringleaders of the armed group," one cannot speak of a great
"feasibility" of revolutions in general in Latín America, considering the
overwhelming density of armed groups that aróse there during the second half
of the twentieth century, and the scarcity of countries (Nicaragua and Cuba,
two small nations) where they were "successfül"~and in the case of
Nicaragua, a quite brief "success" in time (Cuzán 1992).
CONCLUSIÓN
This essay attempts to show the major contradiction that Enrique Dussel
incurs when he defends that there can be armed revolutions that are respectful
of the three criteria of legitimacy he proposes. This contradiction might well
serve as an example of the múltiple "interna! philosophical contradictions"
that Liberation Theology in general "had to face" (Lynch 1994a, b). And, one
can licitly think that from this contradiction derive all the picturesque
examples reviewed here: as classic logic would say, ex contradictione
quodlibet ("from a contradiction, anything follows"). Perhaps the most
undesirable of the consequences of Dussel's way of thinking is the fact that
his theory serves to legitimize violent struggle on both sides of a political or
social dispute at the same time. It is truc that this may not be uncommon in
other theories that try to legitimize as well the use of violence: the same
theoretical suppositions are often invoked on both sides in a conflict, each one
deducing from them, however, "their own right" to use violence. Thus, this
kind of theories not only fail to stop a violent confrontation, but often reaffírm
each of the opposing sides in their legitimacy in the destruction of each other
(Quintana-Paz 2009). If LE proponents want to have the future that
contemporary defenders of it foresee (Petrella 2006), such contradictions need
to be addressed and, if possible, solved.
It is interesting to see how other philosophical approaches based, as LE,
on the idea of "the other," take a totally different attitude towards violence,
and reject it in any case. "Pacifist" approaches like this may be seen in
examples of interdisciplinary thought such as the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1976) and Gianni Vattimo (1987). This hermeneutics highlights the
fact that violence is always an irrational interruption of dialogue, and therefore
what is reasonable, and less alien to human reason, is never to cióse off the
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effbrt to understand the other (and ourselves through the other). Whereas LE
assesses peaceful means only with regard to their efficiency (Dussel 1998:
377), these other perspectives simply show the essential link of our "rational
being" with our "always being open to dialogue," the essential link of reason
with peace, the essential incompatibility of reason with totalities closed off to
an excluded "other." It is easy to perceive a debt of this way of thinking to
such authors as Walter Benjamín, Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, and
certain passages of Jean-Paul Sartre (Vattimo 1983). All pacifism is defended
regardless of whether the absence of violence is "useful" or not, contrary to
Dussel 's focus on usefulness. But these theoretical developments might well
leave one with a sense of dissatisfaction. In the real world, it is not
uncommon that at least one side in a potentially violent conflict is not
interested in dialogue or peace. Should we be faithful to our "rational being"
and be "open to dialogue," as these authors commend, even when someone is
already exterminating human beings? Would it be "rational" to wait for a
violent aggressor to "engage in a dialogue," or would it be simply utopian
(and irresponsible)? Hermeneutic philosophers and their pacifist versión of
thinking about the question of "the other" look as little promising as Dussel's
versión, although both currents claim the necessity of addressing that question
as the main target of contemporary thought (Saladino-García 2010).
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that quite probably the "claim
for otherness" that Dussel (2006) has repeatedly expressed as one of the main
features of his thinking is not a good guiding principie to determine when it
is legitímate to use violence-whether in Dussel's versión of this "claim" or in
that developed by hermeneutic authors. Dussel seems to forget to care about
"the others" in violence (that is, all the victims, those who suffer it, be it
"legitímate" or not, according to Dussel's criteria). This is so because the
"guilty" victim, the "hated oppressor," is also an "other." And hermeneutic
authors do not seem to care enough about victims in general, and their
"otherness," in order to engage in their active defense when these "others" are
under violent attack. In fact, in recent years, some have radically changed
their views and adopted a quite pro-violent, revolutionary stance (Vattimo
2011), not very dissimilar to Dussel's--a move that surely makes them sound
less utopian, but not more coherent, as this essay tried to show.
The "claim for otherness" that Dussel has always supported was wrapped
in some of his earlier writings in a philosophical language not especially clear.
Obscure assertions like "the revelation of the other is shown in my world as
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a creation of the impossible from my selmess," were not unusual (Dussel
1973: 78). In this sense, the challenge that Dussel accepted in more recent
works is not to be overlooked. Dussel finally undertook to make a clear
assessment of what this "claim for otherness" implies in practical terms, and
in relation to a clear-cut political issue-violence. And he did so by
introducing fruitfiíl connections to philosophies like those of Habermas, Apel,
and Aristotle, quite alien, prima facie, to this "claim for otherness." The
unclear 1970s language has given way lately to an interesting adoption of
terms from new (Habermas, Apel) and oíd (Aristotelian) traditions. Dussel's
initial use of arcane philosophical terminology, understandable perhaps only
to other philosophers, has given way to political, economic, historical,
linguistic, and sociological terms that grant his theory an undeniable
interdisciplinary flavor. All this has a certain relevance and merit that one
should not dispute. Nonetheless, the more clear and interdisciplinary Dussel
has made his point, the more clearly its deep contradictions have become
apparent.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE SELF:
ROLE - TAKING AND INSIGHT
Thomas J. Scheff
University of California-Santa Barbara
The need for integration may be the single most important issue facing social
science, the humanities and their sub-disciplines, especially given the scope
of the social/behavioral problems facing humanity. One path toward
integrating disciplines, sub-disciplines, and micro-macro levéis is suggested
by Spinoza's idea ofpart/whole methodology, moving rapidly back and forth
between concrete instances and general ideas. Any discipline, sub-discipline
or level can serve as a valuable stepping-off place, but to advance further,
integration with at least one other viewpoint may be necessary. This essay
links three hitherto sepárate subjects: role-taking, meditation, and a theory
of emotion. The idea of role-taking plays a central parí in sociological social
psychology. Meditation implies the same process in terms ofa selfable to
witness the ego. Drama theon'es a/so depend upon a witnessing self that
establishes a safe zone forresolving intense emotions. All three approaches
imply that the everyday ego is largely automated. In one of her novéis,
Virginia Woolf suggests three crucial points about automated thought:
incredible speed, howitinvolves role-taking, and by implication, thepresence
ofa witnessing self.
LITERARY AND SOCIAL STUDIES: PART/WHOLE METHOD
O ne ofthe first philosophers of science, Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), outlined what amounts to a method for understanding the
human world. He proposed that we humans are so complex that
even to begin to understand us, one needs to move rapidly between "the least
parts and greatest wholes" (Sacksteder 1991: 75). What he called least parts
were concrete particulars; "greatest wholes," abstract ideas, concepts and
theories (Sacksteder 1991; Scheff 1997). William Blake (1820) proposed a
similar idea in one sentence: "Art and science cannot exist but in minutely
